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This study aims to explore and examine the liquidity risk that Islamic banks are exposed to in 
a comparison with conventional and hybrid banks in the case of 145 commercial banks for the 
period of 1996–2015. This study also examines the factors determining the liquidity risk 
exposure of the sampled banks by employing a panel data regression model with the random 
effect technique by considering bank specification, macroeconomy, governance and 
ownership-related variables. The findings for the sampled banks demonstrate that Islamic 
banks are more exposed to liquidity risk than conventional and hybrid banks. In addition, the 
results show that the stringency of capital regulations and credit risk have a negative and 
significant impact on liquidity risk. Moreover, the results demonstrate that liquid assets and 
long-term debts are positively associated with liquidity risk exposure. While the empirical 
results show that long-term debt significantly affects liquidity risk, the results indicate an 
insignificant impact of liquid assets on the liquidity risk exposure of the sampled banks. The 
results also depict that bank size, governance and ownership concentration as well as GDP are 
important control variables in reducing the liquidity risk exposure of Islamic banks. 
 




Banking theory suggests that one of the key functions that banks conduct is the transformation 
of maturities (Distinguin et al., 2013) so that they can finance their illiquid risky assets by 
liquid liabilities. This is particularly important when banks face the early liquidation of their 
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assets to meet their financial obligations for several reasons, such as a bank rush (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009a: 3783). While in such cases a liquidity risk may cause an interruption in the 
economy due to the early liquidation of productive investments (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), 
it may also result in bank defaults and failures. Even though liquidity risk has been an ongoing 
concern to managers as well as fund providers, the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has 
intensely re-emphasised the importance of measuring, forecasting and understanding liquidity 
risk and its determinants (Papavassiliou, 2013; Weiß, 2013: 3334; Acharya and Naqvi, 2012: 
349; Horvath et al., 2012; Sadka, 2011: 144; Jasiene et al., 2012: 190). 
As intermediary institutions, banks hold large amounts of short-term liabilities to finance long-
term assets (Saunders and Cornett, 2006: 470). However, due to the nature of the short-term 
liabilities contracts, the holders (mainly depositors) of these types of accounts have the right to 
claim their funds back at any given time. Consequently, liquidity risk occurs on the liability 
side when account holders withdraw their funds (deposits) simultaneously at a time when a 
bank cannot match such large and sudden demands. In such a case, to manage risk, banks tend 
to supply the withdrawals by selling their liquid assets or by borrowing funds from the money 
market. In the process of liquidating, although most of the assets are tradeable and 
transformable into cash, converting some of the assets can be costly when they are only sold at 
low prices (Saunders and Cornett, 2006: 470), which consequently may lead to insolvency risk. 
Liquidity risk, therefore, occurs when a bank is unable to cover its financial obligations when 
they fall due without unbearable costs (BCBS, 2008). Accordingly, the absence of effective 
models to measure and assess liquidity risk is a key factor that leads to unexpected mismatches 
in banks’ balance sheets, resulting in liquidity risk for banks (Cucinelli, 2013: 51).  
Islamic banking emerged as an alternative financing institution in the 1970s in response to the 
demand to have alternative financing solutions compliant with principles derived from Islamic 
law (Shari’ah) (Khediri, 2015).  Similar to other banks in terms of functions, Islamic banks are 
believed to play an important intermediary role in facilitating the transformation of savings 
from the public for the purpose of reinvesting them in the economy through channelling the 
accumulated funds to entrepreneurs and financing activities that are expected to contribute to 
the real economy by abiding by the religious sensitivities. By conducting their financial 
operations within the norms of Islam and the parameters of Islamic finance, Islamic banks have 
to ensure that every financial contract must refer to a tangible and identifiable underlying asset 
(Cox and Thomas, 2005: 171). Accordingly, due to the unique nature of the Islamic financial 
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principles, products and operations, Islamic banks, theoretically, are perceived to be key 
contributors in promoting economic growth (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; 94; Asutay, 2007; 
Khan, 2010) through financing economic activities, generating jobs, and fostering social 
welfare (Khan, 2010; Asutay, 2012; Ali et al., 2013). In addition, as an essential feature, based 
on the substance of the objectives of Islamic financial law, Islamic banks are expected to utilise 
financing instruments oriented more towards equity or profit-loss-sharing and risk-sharing 
based financing activities that are mainly illiquid investments, rather than the debt/sale-based 
modes of financing activities. Due to such distinctive features, Islamic banks are exposed to 
more complexity in managing their assets and liabilities, implying that Islamic banks are 
expected to face a wider financing gap and, hence, greater exposure to liquidity risk than 
conventional banks and hybrid banks. Importantly, this becomes an issue, as the tools and 
instruments of managing such risks are further restricted in the case of Islamic banking due to 
the attachment to the norms and parameters of Islamic finance. Thus, given that liquidity risk 
is an essential area in the financial system, it has different implications for Islamic banks as 
compared to conventional and hybrid banks (conventional banks with Islamic windows). 
This paper, hence, aims to measure and analyse the liquidity risk exposure of Islamic banks 
compared to conventional and hybrid banks covering the period between 1996 and 2015. The 
sample consists of 145 banks from 21 countries, and the data are analysed through a panel data 
regression model. In addition, this paper examines the determinants of liquidity risk exposure 
by the sampled banks with particular reference to the stringency on capital regulations, credit 
risk, liquid assets and long-term debt. 
As for the contribution of this study, despite the significant role of liquidity creation and the 
critical impact of liquidity risk on the economy, these issues remain unexplored within Islamic 
banking and finance through empirical research. In addition, comparative research on the 
subject matter between Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks in general, and in the case of 
the GCC region in particular, either does not existed or is scarce. This research, hence, 
contributes to the literature in these two areas. Firstly, it measures the key determinants of the 
liquidity creation function and the liquidity risk exposure and, more specifically, it assesses the 
impact of the stringency of related banking regulatory and supervisory standards on the 
liquidity creation function and liquidity risk exposure in the banking sector in a comparative 
manner between Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks, which the existing body of 
knowledge has not provided. Secondly, since the GCC region is considered the home of a 
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dynamic banking sector where Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks operate in parallel under 
similar economic conditions and banking standards, this research provides empirical analyses 
of the liquidity creation behaviour of GCC banks and their exposure to liquidity risk in a 
comparative manner. 
Regarding the structure of this paper, Section 2 presents a literature review while Section 3 
presents the hypotheses development. Section 4 explains the research methodology and 
modelling. This is followed by the descriptive statistics of the examined data. Before running 
the regressions analysis, statistical tests are performed to check the nature and validity of the 
assessed data and the examined variables are presented. Then, the developed hypotheses are 
tested through panel data regressions with a random effects model in Section 5, where the 
results of the sensitivity tests are also presented to evidence the robustness of the obtained 
results. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.  
2. Liquidity Risk Exposure: A Literature Review  
Since liquidity provision is the focal purpose of the banking sector (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
2000: 296), banks by definition are exposed to liquidity risk. The key task of risk managers in 
banks and other financial institutions, hence, is to mitigate the effects of such risk (Jasiene et 
al., 2012: 189). In the banking industry, therefore, liquidity risk and its management is a critical 
factor that impacts the financial stability and profitability of banks as well as their customer 
assurance and the decisions they make. Furthermore, liquidity risk is one of the serious 
elements that trigger other risks which negatively affect the business operations of banks. 
Consequently, although banks face different types of risk, liquidity risk remains the critical risk 
that can eventually lead to insolvency risk (Jasiene et al., 2012: 186).  
According to Diamond (1991: 709), liquidity risk refers to the risk of losing expected revenues 
that investors face as a result of early excessive withdrawals by fund suppliers. In a similar 
manner, Papavassiliou (2013: 184) defines liquidity risk as the risk of failing to buy or sell 
assets at the market price when required. Within this context, liquidity risk is classified into 
two categories: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. While market liquidity risk 
occurs as an inability of banks to sell their illiquid assets at market price within short notice, 
funding liquidity risk signifies the inability of banks to cover the liquidity needs of funds 
providers (IFSB, 2012: 31; Haan and End, 2013: 3930). In this regard, it is significant to state 
that the focus of this research is funding liquidity risk. Along parallel lines, funding liquidity 
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risk is defined as the inability of banks to settle their obligations in a timely manner (The 
European Central Bank, 2009; Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2013: 2173). Giannotti et al. (2010: 
99) state that liquidity risk is the possibility that a bank during a particular period of time 
becomes unable to honour its duties with immediacy. Hence, liquidity is the ability of a bank 
to meet the financing demands of increases in assets and meet its financial obligations as they 
become due without incurring intolerable costs (Giannotti et al., 2010: 99); thus, failure to meet 
this results in liquidity risk. 
As stated by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013: 2174), “liquidity risk arises because revenues and 
outlays are not synchronised”. Therefore, as the main function undertaken by banks is the 
financing of long-term assets by short-term liabilities, liquidity risk is an inherent characteristic 
of banks and, hence, inevitable (Haan and End, 2013: 3930; Eichberger and Summer, 2005: 
550; Carletti et al., 2007: 1069; Distinguin et al., 2013: 3295). Such a critical function leads to 
market and funding liquidity risk (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The criticality of liquidity risk 
also stems from its implications for portfolio diversification strategies and investment 
activities, as it also plays a vital role in asset prices (Papavassiliou, 2013: 184). 
Despite liquid assets being considered as a solid shield against liquidity shortages, holding high 
levels of liquid assets incentivises banks to increase their lending activities, which leads to an 
increase in their financing gaps and negatively impacts their stability, which is associated with 
banking insolvency (Wagner, 2007: 121; Haan and End, 2013: 3933). In a similar argument, 
as evidenced by Wager (2007: 122), among others, when banks enjoy a substantial access to 
asset sales markets, undertaking risky investments is expected, as banks’ loans or financing 
activities are known to be illiquid and risky. However, with the recent developments and 
sophistications in the financial markets, banks are provided with different types of instruments 
that facilitate a variety of options to transfer risk through an easy access to asset sales markets 
(Wagner, 2007: 122; Holmstrom and Tirole, 2000: 296).  
In exploring the sources of liquidity risk, banks mainly depend on equity capital and deposits 
to finance their lending and investment activities (Silva and Divino, 2013: 266). However, a 
low level of bank profitability may lead to some fund providers withdrawing their capital at 
inconvenient times. For Islamic banks, this is even more critical, as in their case the deposits 
hold equity features, which are based on a risk-sharing concept that may escalate the ambiguity 
on depositors’ return, which, in return, may increase the withdrawals (Beck et al., 2013: 436). 
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In addition, the complexity in Islamic banking products and operations increases costs and, 
thus, lowers the efficiency of Islamic banks and exposes them to higher degrees of risk (Beck 
et al., 2013: 436). In such a process, the creditors may panic, which in turn may cause liquidity 
risk that may trigger insolvency risk. To survive from such a critical situation and honour their 
obligations, banks use their reserves and liquid assets. In extreme scenarios, in responding to a 
high demand for deposit withdrawal, banks liquidate their loans at high costs, as a result of the 
fire-sale price (Wagner, 2007: 122; Silva and Divino, 2013: 266). In further exploring this, 
Holmstrom and Tirole (2000: 295) suggest that long-term debts can also play a vital role in 
allowing banks to cover their liquidity shocks. Moreover, the interbank market enables the 
transfer of risk from banks with low levels of equity to banks with higher levels of equity 
(Eichberger and Summer, 2005: 553). 
Banking regulatory and supervisory agencies play an important role in overseeing the banks’ 
operations and activities to prevent or reduce problems of asymmetric information, adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The responsibilities of such bodies include regulating the 
governments safety net through deposit insurance, restrictions on banks activities, capital 
requirements, bank supervision, information disclosure requirements, costumer protection and 
restrictions on banking competition (Mishkin, 2001; Barth et al., 2004). Although such 
regulatory and supervisory monitoring and restrictions enhance the financial stability of the 
banking sector, high supervisory restrictions may lead to an increase of banks’ incentives to 
undertake risky activities (Mishkin, 2001; Barth et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, liquidity risk has always been a top priority for regulatory bodies, as it is believed 
that enhancing banks’ ability to have an adequate access to the asset trading market, as well as 
developing banking market segmentation by enhancing the diversity of the market players and 
products, may improve the liquidity position and make banks less exposed to such systematic 
risk (Wagner, 2007: 122). To reduce the possibilities of banks’ exposure to liquidity risk, 
banking regulators may promote financial stability and efficiency by adopting new regulations 
and standards (Silva and Divino, 2013: 266). For example, in response to the recent financial 
crisis, in December 2010 Basel III issued new principles and guidelines on liquidity risk 
management, whereby two new liquidity ratios are introduced, namely the liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) (BCBS, 2010; Haan and End, 2013: 3930; 
Silva and Divino, 2013: 266). It is important to state that these two ratios have still not been 
enforced on all banks yet and it is proposed that they be implemented gradually between 2015 
Mohammad, Sabri; Asutay, Mehmet; Dixon, Rob & Platonova, Elena (2020). “Liquidity Risk Exposure 
and its Determinants in the Banking Sector: A Comparative Analysis between Islamic, Conventional and 
Hybrid Banks”.  
 
 7 
and 2019 (Haan and End, 2013: 3930; Silva and Divino, 2013: 266). 
Although liquidity risk in the banking sector is not a very fresh topic, the systematic literature 
has not focused adequately on approaches to measuring liquidity risk exposure. In the banking-
related empirical studies that examine liquidity position indicators, they use balance sheet 
ratios based on accounting data (Matz, 2008: 4; Distinguin et al., 2013: 3300), such as loans to 
deposits ratio (Iannotta et al., 2007: 2132; Bourke, 1989: 72; Molyneux and Thornton, 1994: 
439; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004: 603; Klomp and Haan, 2012: 3198). In addition, Saunders 
and Cornett (2006: 476) state that the ratio of loans to deposits, borrowed funds to total assets, 
and loan commitments to assets are also widely utilised to proxy liquidity risk. Moreover, other 
researchers measured liquidity risk through the ratio of loans to total assets (Athanagolou et 
al., 2006: 9), loans to customer and short-term funding ratios (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007: 
227; Kosmidou, 2008: 150; Naceur and Kandil, 2009: 77). However, it is argued that depending 
on such ratios in measuring liquidity risk could be insufficient (Matz, 2008: 4; Distinguin et 
al., 2013: 3300). Saunders and Cornett (2006) propose a proxy for liquidity risk based on the 
financing gap, which is used in this research to measure the distance magnitude of likelihood 
of banks’ inability to meet their financial obligations in a timely fashion. However, the existing 
empirical research that examines the determinants of liquidity risk remains relatively scarce. 
Despite liquidity risk exposure remaining one of the most challenging issues within the Islamic 
banking industry, it is quite striking that the existing literature lacks empirical studies that focus 
on liquidity risk exposure measurement and its determinants. Notwithstanding such a reality, 
some researchers have identified different sources of liquidity risk in the Islamic banking 
industry. For example, Khan and Ahmed (2001), Ahmed (2011: 60) and Ali (2012) state that 
one of the fundamental reasons for liquidity risk in Islamic banking is the limited accessibility 
of the Shari’ah-complaint money market and the slow development of financial instruments, 
which prevent Islamic banks from raising external funds when needed. It is also argued that, 
due to the predominance of debt-based assets (such as murabahah as a debt-based contract, 
which occupies about 97.5 percent of Islamic financial transactions in Malaysia; see Asutay, 
2007 and 2012; Khediri, 2015), Islamic banks face difficulties in liquidating them when needed 
due to the restrictions on sale of debt (Ahmed, 2011: 60). In addition, most available 
conventional instruments that are used for liquidity management are interest-based, and Islamic 
banks are not permitted to deal with them. It is also argued that due to the unique characteristics 
of some of the Islamic financial instruments, Islamic banks face additional exposure to liquidity 
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risk including the inability to trade murabahah or bay’ al salam, which can be traded only at 
par value (Iqbal and Mirakhour, 2007).  
Furthermore, with regards to the liability side, Islamic banks depend heavily on current 
accounts, which demand deposits and can be withdrawn at any time, which may lead to a bank 
run (Iqbal and Mirakhour, 2007). A small number of Islamic banks, compared to their 
conventional counterparts and with different interpretations of Shari’ah teachings (Islamic 
financial law), can have other critical sources of liquidity risk. For example, the contract of 
bay’ al-dayn (sale of debt) is allowed and commonly practiced in Malaysian financial markets. 
This type of contract, however, is not permitted by the mainstream Shari’ah scholars outside 
of Malaysia, who maintain that debt can only be traded at face value. If trade is not at face 
value, it involves an element of riba, namely interest. Therefore, Shari’ah scholars should 
engage in finding solutions to such issues (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). In addition, “the 
restrictions of Islamic banks to certain asset classes, the limited use of hedging instruments and 
the lack of high-quality liquid assets such as Shari’ah-compliant government bonds can also 
increase the riskiness of Sharia-compliant financial institutions” (Beck et al., 2013: 436). 
To conclude, through reviewing the liquidity risk related literature, it can be stated that the 
literature suffers from a shortage of research that focuses on measuring liquidity risk exposure 
and assessing its determinants in the banking sector in general and in the case of Islamic banks 
in particular. Furthermore, the literature lacks the provision of empirical evidence of assessing 
the liquidity exposure of Islamic banks in a comparative manner with conventional and hybrid 
banks. This, therefore, makes this study rather timely and also rationalises its conduct. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
This section provides a detailed discussion on the construction of the hypotheses aiming to 
examine liquidity risk exposure in Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks as well as the key 
determinants that may affect such exposure. 
Measuring the Impact of Bank Type: Islamic Banks (IB), Conventional Banks (CB) and 
Hybrid Banks (HB) 
In order to have a clear understanding of the expected liquidity risk exposure of Islamic banks 
compared to conventional and hybrid banks, it is important to determine some implications 
Mohammad, Sabri; Asutay, Mehmet; Dixon, Rob & Platonova, Elena (2020). “Liquidity Risk Exposure 
and its Determinants in the Banking Sector: A Comparative Analysis between Islamic, Conventional and 
Hybrid Banks”.  
 
 9 
related to the unique nature of Islamic financial operations and products on liquidity risk, as 
discussed earlier. Such a unique nature imposes more complications on Islamic banks in 
managing their asset and liability positions. Hence, it is theoretically accepted that Islamic 
banks are more exposed to liquidity risk than conventional and hybrid banks. For instance, due 
to Shari’ah restrictions on the sale of debt, Islamic banks face difficulties in liquidating debt-
based assets when needed (Ahmed, 2011: 60). This causes greater complexity and limited 
accessibility in obtaining capital from the money market (Ahmed, 2011: 60). Moreover, 
Islamic banks do not have access to many common conventional financial tools and 
instruments in managing their liquidity risk due to the involvement of gharar (uncertainty), 
including, among others, options and derivatives (El-Gamal, 2006: 61-62; Khan, 2010: 807), 
which leave Islamic banks with wider financing gaps and, hence, more vulnerable to liquidity 
risk.  
Islamic banks also hold large amount of current accounts that can be withdrawn at any time 
(Iqbal and Mirakhour, 2007), which may cause wider financing gaps. Considering the small 
number of Islamic banks (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008) and the slow growth of financial products 
(Khan and Ahmed, 2001), the lack of an integrated and sophisticated payment and settlement 
scheme to ensure that all payment transactions are made according to Shari’ah, and differences 
in the standardisation of documentation, product, process and accounting criteria impose 
different degrees of liquidity risk on Islamic banks (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; Abdullah, 2011: 
14). Moreover, the equity characteristics of deposits and the risk-sharing concept of Islamic 
financial products can cause an increase in uncertainty regarding depositors’ return and 
increase the possibility of withdrawals, which can lead to bank runs. Moreover, the complex 
nature of Islamic financing modes also leads to higher costs that reduce efficiency of Islamic 
banks.  
Islamic financing principles, thus, play a critical role in increasing the riskiness of Islamic 
banks (Beck et al., 2013: 436; El Gamal, 2006; Ben Arab and Elmelki, 2008: 80). Accordingly, 
such principles make both the nature of financial operations in Islamic banking and the Islamic 
financial products themselves more complex. Such a complex nature implies that Islamic banks 
are expected to face a wider financing gap and greater difficulties in obtaining the required 
funds to manage their liquidity risk than conventional and hybrid banks. On the other hand, 
since hybrid banks are a mixture of Islamic and conventional bank operations in the form of 
conventional commercial banks having Islamic windows, they are expected to be in a middle 
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position between Islamic and conventional banks in facing liquidity risk. As a result, the 
following hypotheses are developed: 
Hypothesis 1: Islamic banks are exposed to higher degrees of liquidity risk than conventional 
and hybrid banks. 
Hypothesis 2: Hybrid banks that offer Islamic windows are less exposed to liquidity risk than 
Islamic banks yet are more exposed than conventional banks.  
Banking Capital Regulation (CAP) 
Capital regulation remains a top priority of banking supervisory regulations as a key 
determinant of liquidity (Distinguin et al., 2013: 3304). Since capital regulations may vary 
across countries, it is important to control for potential country effects (Barth et al., 2004; 
Distinguin et al., 2013: 3302).  
CAP is considered as a critical factor influencing the behaviours of the banks, as emphasised 
by the Basel Committee (Laeven and Levine, 2009: 263; Distinguin et al., 2013: 3302), which 
is calculated as an index based on the World Bank guidance for banking regulation and 
supervision in conjunction with the Basel Accords (Barth et al., 2004; Distinguin et al., 2013: 
3303; Laeven and Levine, 2009: 260). Accordingly, a greater value of bank capital regulation 
index implies a stricter regulatory oversight under which banks operate (Barth et al., 2004; 
Klomp and Haan, 2012: 3201; Distinguin et al., 2013: 3303; Laeven and Levine, 2009: 260). 
It is, hence, important to point out that such an index does not measure bank capital 
requirements ratios. It does, however, gauge the supervisory behaviour of assessing and 
validating the capital level at risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009: 263). 
According to Laeven and Levine (2009: 260), the purpose of setting stricter capital regulation 
is to lessen the risk-taking behaviour of influential bank shareholders by forcing them to 
provide further funds at risk to meet the capital requirement. Distinguin et al. (2013: 3303) 
argue that stricter capital oversight incentivises banks to enhance their capital ratio and hence 
hold a higher capital level. Accordingly, holding a high level of capital implies narrower 
financing gaps, which directly decrease the liquidity risk that banks may face.  
As capital adequacy determines the amount of a bank’s loans that must be covered by its equity, 
it prevents them from taking excessive leverage to avoid insolvency risk. This suggests that 
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high restrictions on capital adequacy ratio may limit banks’ lending capacity (Eichberger and 
Summer, 2005: 550), and, hence, it may have negative association with their financing gap, 
which could decrease the possibilities of banks facing liquidity risk. Moreover, applying 
stricter capital adequacy leads to higher acceptance standards and screening processes for 
generating new loans (Bolt and Tieman, 2004; Thakor, 1996), which has a direct impact on 
minimising the banks’ financing gap and, hence, lessening the possibility of liquidity risk that 
banks may face. Consequently, in line with this argument, it is expected that a high level of 
stringency on capital requirement is negatively associated with the liquidity risk exposure that 
banks may face. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 3: The tighter the capital regulations, the less is the financing gap and, accordingly, 
the less is the liquidity risk exposure that banks face. 
Credit Risk (CR) 
The ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans has been widely used as a proxy for credit risk 
(Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011: 311; Klomp and Haan, 2012: 3198; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008: 521; Athanasoglou et al., 2008: 27-28; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011: 311; Iannotta et 
al., 2007: 2132). Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011: 311) state that a high loan loss provision to 
gross loans ratio indicates a deterioration in credit quality that leads to worsening bank 
profitability and productivity. Hence, it can be argued that in a rational banking industry, such 
low credit quality may negatively impact the banks’ lending and financing activities, which 
immediately narrows down the banks’ financing gaps. This, as a result, can have a negative 
impact on the credit risk regarding banks’ ability to borrow additional funds from the money 
market to cover their liquidity needs, as it may raise other money market players’ concerns, 
which may interfere with heir incentives to respond to such banks’ liquidity needs. On the other 
hand, even if other money market members agree to lend, the funds will be available only at a 
high cost.  
In these cases, the rational position for such banks with a high credit risk is to narrow their 
financing gap by reducing their lending activities or by raising more funds through offering 
high rates to attract more deposits. Hence, it can be stated that a high possibility of credit risk 
may push a bank to minimise its financing gap to mitigate the potential liquidity risk exposure. 
Accordingly, this research develops the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of credit risk, the narrower the financing gap and, hence, 
the lower levels of liquidity risk the banks will face. 
Liquid Assets (LA) 
The illiquid nature of banks’ assets is considered as one of the critical sources of the fragility 
of the banking sector (Wagner, 2007: 121). Therefore, it is required by regulatory bodies that 
all banks have in place liquid assets to protect against liquidity risk. Liquid assets that banks 
hold can be considered as a ‘net defensive position’ against liquidity risks (Davis, 2088: 114). 
Hence, a bank can enhance its capability to fund any liquidity scarcity by increasing its liquid 
assets (Gatev and Strahan, 2006: 867).  
Among others, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004: 19) and Wagner (2007: 121) state that an active 
bank in the loan sales market would have a lesser degree of liquidity shocks through risk 
diversification and transformation. Nowadays, banks try to evade stocking liquid assets due to 
lower profits that they generate (Iannotta et al., 2007: 2132) as well as because of “the low 
frequency of crises, limited liability of shareholders, and the safety net” (Davis, 2008: 114). A 
good testimony to this argument is the decline in the liquid assets of banks. For instance, in the 
UK, banks’ liquid assets were 30 percent of the total assets in the 1950s. However, nowadays 
they are only 1 percent of their total assets (Davis, 2008: 114).  
Holding high levels of liquid assets, therefore, may lead banks to “offset risks they have 
transferred from their balance sheet by taking on new risks. They may also be encouraged to 
increase their risk because a higher liquidity of loans allows them to liquidate more easily in a 
crisis” (Wagner, 2007: 122). A high level of liquid assets, therefore, would boost the banks’ 
confidence in gaining easy access to the loan sales market. As a result, this may decrease the 
possibility of bank runs, which may boost banks’ incentives to invest in risky assets or increase 
risk-taking activities (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004: 19). Based on this argument, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the levels of liquid assets that banks hold, the greater the risk taking 
incentives of banks and, hence, the higher the liquidity risk the banks are exposed to.  
Long-Term Debt (LTD) 
Long-term debt is considered as one of the critical components of the capital structure of banks 
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(Gill et al., 2011: 4; Bhagat et al., 2011: 1582). Since debts are exempted from corporate taxes, 
bank managers may be incentivised to increase their lending and financing activities depending 
on such external funds (Bhagat et al., 2011: 1583), which will increase the financing gap and 
hence negatively affect the liquidity position (Drudi and Giordano, 2000: 961). Therefore, 
banks’ exposure to insolvency may occur. On the other side of the balance sheet, such a high 
degree of riskiness makes a negative impression on the bank management as managers seek 
external funds to cover their liquidity needs when they are unable to raise them internally 
(Bhagat et al., 2011: 1583). This, in turn, can lead to a customer panic, which may result in a 
large amount of withdrawals that may lead to a bank run.  
It can be also argued that “because long-term debt lowers the manager’s continuation value 
through the likelihood of bankruptcy, the manager chooses lower long-term debt to lower the 
probability of bankruptcy” (Bhagat et al., 2011: 1583). However, an increase in the risk 
aversion attitude of bank managers decreases the productivity that managers can generate in 
each period, and, hence, the anticipated compensation declines. Therefore, managers focus on 
their own initial pay-off by raising external funds to boost the business activities rather than 
their continuation value. Managers choose greater long-term debt to exploit the positive effects 
of ex post debt tax shields on the surplus they generate from external financing to increase their 
initial pay-off (Bhagat et al., 2011: 1584). 
Furthermore, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007: 150) state that a large debt-to-assets ratio 
indicates lower fractions of shares possessed by bulk shareholders, which implies a fragile 
structure of the firm's ownership. High levels of debt may also hinder investigating innovative 
businesses and, thus, negatively impact bank profitability (Barnett and Salomon, 2012: 1310; 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007: 150) as high debt levels are associated with larger expenses 
(Perrini et al., 2008: 319; Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999: 229; Gill et al., 2011: 5). 
Accordingly, lower bank profitability and higher expense levels may easily discourage new 
investors and depositors, thereby causing a dramatic decline in deposits. This in turn, leaves 
banks with wider financing gaps and, hence, larger liquidity risk exposure is expected to be 
faced by banks. Accordingly, the final hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 6: The higher ratio of long-term debt is positively associated with higher degrees 
of liquidity risk exposure that banks face. 
4. Methodology and Model Selection 
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4.1. Sample and Data 
As identified in the introduction section, this study aims to examine commercial banks on a 
global level as the main reason for the sample selection is the quantitative nature of the 
examined data, due to the fact that a panel data regressions analysis requires a considerably 
large number of observations, as a small population may lead to inconsistent outcomes 
(Baltagi, 2005: 53, 151, 194). In addition, due to the small number of Islamic banks compared 
to conventional banks, global data can provide a sufficient sample to obtain sizable data. Thus, 
the sample in this study consists of 145 commercial banks from 21 countries including, for the 
period of 1996 to 2015, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Yemen. It is worth mentioning that that 
the choice of the sampled banks is purely based on the data availability from various databases, 
including the Bankscope database. 
Since this research aims to examine the implications of the unique nature of the Islamic 
financial principles on Islamic banks’ liquidity risk, and considering a comparative approach 
will provide a more meaningful understanding of the obtained findings, the sample of this 
research consists of Islamic banks and conventional banks to test the developed hypotheses in 
a comparative manner. As an important distinction, the nature of bank types in this study also 
includes hybrid banks to examine whether such a mixed nature of conducting banking activities 
has different implications for the liquidity position compared to full-fledged Islamic and 
conventional banks. It should also be noted that this type of bank has an undeniable market 
size that needs to be explored in relation to liquidity risk. 
The data period covers from 1996 to 2015 and the number of observations with unbalanced 
panel data is 1454. As for the period covered, the observations commence in 1996, as most of 
the Islamic banks were established from 1996 onwards, which corresponds to the commencing 
of the internationalisation stage of the Islamic banking industry formation process (Asutay, 
2015; Platonova et al., 2016), as in 1980s, the one-country one-Islamic bank model reigned as 
a strategy (Asutay, 2015). 
In ensuring the reliability of the examined data, it is important to elaborate on the approaches 
and sources followed in the data collection process. With regards to bank-specific variables, 
following Agoraki et al. (2011: 43), Naceur and Omran, (2011: 7) and Poon and Firth (2005), 
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the individual bank balance sheet data and income statements were obtained from Bankscope. 
Following Naceur and Omran (2011:7), this research used unconsolidated financial statements 
and consolidated statements when the unconsolidated statements are not accessible, with the 
confirmation that each bank is contained only once in the dataset. In addition, following Barth 
et al. (2004), Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006: 413-414), Agoraki et al. 
(2011: 42) and Klomp and Hann (2012: 3200), the bank capital regulatory and supervisory data 
were collected from the World Bank survey data (World Bank: 2017), which was set by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in cooperation with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, in line with Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), 
Dinger and Hagen (2009), Naceur and Omran (2011: 7), the macroeconomic variables and the 
governance indicator variables were obtained from World Bank survey data (World Bank: 
2017). In addition, GDP data were obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database (2017). 
4.2. Definitions and Measurement of the Variables 
This section aims to provide the definitions and measurements of the dependent and 
independent variables. 
Measuring liquidity risk 
Following Saunders and Cornett (2006: 477-78), this research measures liquidity risk exposure 
based on the ‘financing gap’ method, which according to Saunders and Cornett (2006: 478) is 
defined as the difference between average bank loans and average bank core deposits. 
According to Saunders and Cornett (2004: 376), the core deposits include demand deposits, 
money market deposit accounts, negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, money 
market deposit accounts, other saving accounts and retail certificates of deposits (CDs). In 
addition, to have a meaningful analysis, the financing gap is standardised by the average total 




                                      
where: FGR refers to the financing gap ratio; AL refers to average loans; ACD refers to average 
core deposits; ATA refers to average total assets. 
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The FGR indicates that a higher value of financing gap ratio indicates a greater degree of 
liquidity risk that the bank is exposed to (Saunders and Cornett, 2006: 477). 
Bank type: Islamic banks (IB), conventional banks (CB), and hybrid banks (HB) 
The most effective way to represent the bank type in an econometric model is through the 
dummy variable. When the independent variables have a qualitative nature, such as group 
categories (in this research it is banking industry type, such as Islamic, conventional and hybrid 
banks), the dummy variable can be used to represent the effects of these explanatory variables 
in the regressions analysis (Maddala, 1992: 306). Accordingly, the effect of Islamic banks type 
on liquidity risk is captured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a fully fledged 
Islamic bank and 0 otherwise. The same method is applied to conventional and hybrid banks.  
Since there is a constant term in the regression equation, the number of defined dummy 
variables should be lessened by one, and, hence, only two dummy variables are included in the 
model. The excluded dummy variable is taken as the base banking type industry, which is that 
of the Islamic banks in this case. The Islamic banks dummy variable is excluded and taken as 
a base industry in the regressions equations for three reasons. First, the inclusion of all three 
dummy variables leads to multicollinearity, which will either prevent the econometric package 
from running the regression or will omit one of the dummy variables mechanically (Maddala, 
1992: 308). The second reason is to give control of choosing the base dummy variable to the 
researcher rather than to the econometric package, which would randomly omit one of the 
dummy variables. The third reason, excluding the Islamic bank dummy and taking it as the 
base for other two dummy variables, conventional and hybrid banks, is in line with the aim of 
this study in examining the liquidity risk of Islamic banks compared to conventional and hybrid 
banks. 
Capital requirement regulations (CAP) 
Following Barth et al. (2004: 213), Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005: 475), Pasiouras et al. 
(2006: 425), Agoraki et al. (2011) and Klomp and Hann (2012: 3201), the CAP index is 
measured through a survey conducted by the World Bank. Table 1 presents the construction of 
the CAP index. 
The CAP index consists of nine variables that reflect the degree of stringency on the capital 
Mohammad, Sabri; Asutay, Mehmet; Dixon, Rob & Platonova, Elena (2020). “Liquidity Risk Exposure 
and its Determinants in the Banking Sector: A Comparative Analysis between Islamic, Conventional and 
Hybrid Banks”.  
 
 17 
regulations to assess whether certain risk issues, such as credit risk and liquidity risk, in-line 
with the Basel guidelines, are considered in gauging the capital requirements. It also measures 
whether certain market value losses are deducted before fixing the minimum capital 
requirements. Moreover, it also refers to the extent to which the sources of funds that are used 
as capital are required to be proved officially by supervisory and regulatory bodies (Barth et 
al., 2004; Klomp and Haan, 2012: 3201). The variables definitions and the index calculation 
methods of CAP are explained in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Capital Requirement Regulations Index (CAP) 




Whether the capital 
requirement 
reflects certain risk 
elements and 
deducts certain 
market value losses 








3.1.1 + 3.3 + 
3.9.1 + 3.9.2 + 
3.9.3 + (1 if 3.6 < 
0.75)  
 
Yes = 1; No = 0 
3.1.1 Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted 
in-line with the Basel guidelines? Yes/No 
3.3 Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 
Yes/No  
3.9.1 Are market values of loan losses not realised in accounting 
books deducted? Yes/No 
3.9.2 Are unrealised losses in securities portfolios deducted? 
Yes/No  
3.9.3 Are unrealised foreign exchange losses deducted? Yes/No 





funds may be used 
to initially 
capitalise a bank 




stringency = 1.5 
+ 1.6 + 1.7                            
 
1.5: Yes = 1, No 
= 0          
 
1.6 and 1.7: Yes 
= 0, No = 1. 
1.5 Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? Yes/No 
1.6 Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital 
be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
Yes/No 
1.7 Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed 
funds? Yes/No  
CAP index    = (a)+(b)/2 Higher values indicate greater stringency. 
Source: Modified version of Barth et al. (2004)  
Credit risk (CR) 
Credit risk is measured by the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans (Klomp and Haan, 
2012: 3198; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008: 521; Athanasoglou, 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 





Dinger and Hagen (2009: 499) state that the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans is widely 
used as a measurement of the riskiness of banks' business activities. According to Berger and 
Bouwman (2009a), it is important to carefully control for bank risk, as the main reason for 
banks to hold capital is to absorb risk. “The inclusion of risk measure helps to isolate the role 
of capital in supporting the liquidity creation function of banks from the role of capital in 
supporting banks’ function as risk transformers” (Berger and Bouwman, 2009a: 3812). In 
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addition, since high levels of loan loss provisions reflect the deterioration of credit quality, it 
is important to examine its interaction with liquidity risk.  
Long-term debt (LTD) 
The long-term debt variable is calculated as long-term debt scaled by total assets (Waddock 





Long-term debt funding is the sum of senior debt maturing after one year as well as preference 
shares and hybrid capital accounted for as debt (as defined by Bankscope, 2012). This indicator 
is used as long-term debt is considered one of the critical components of the banks’ capital 
structure (Gill et al., 2011: 4; Bhagat et al., 2011: 1582). It should be noted that a higher level 
of debt implies a lower equity ratio (Berríos, 2013: 107), and it also indicates the inability to 
raise the required funds internally and, hence, it is important to proxy for such a variable to test 
its impact on liquidity risk exposure. 
Liquid assets (LA) 
The liquid assets ratio is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (Iannotta et al., 
2007: 2132; Bourke, 1989: 72; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004: 603; Klomp and Haan, 2012: 





This ratio is used to control for differences in bank liquid assets (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004: 
603) as liquid assets are considered as the ‘net defensive position’ against liquidity risks (Davis, 
2088: 114) and enhance banks’ capability to fund any liquidity scarcity (Gatev and Strahan, 
2006: 867). Due to the interrelationship of liquid assets with the banks’ behaviour towards the 
liquidity position, it is taken into consideration to examine its impact on liquidity risk (Gatev 
and Strahan, 2006).  
4.3. Control Variables  
In extending the analysis, several control variables are used in this study relating to ownership, 
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governance and macroeconomy. 
Following the related banking literature (Iannotta et al., 2007; Klomp and Haan, 2012; Berger 
et al., 2007; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Berger and Bouwman, 2009a; Demirguc-Kunt, 2004; 
Agoraki et al., 2011), we include bank size and GDP as control variables. Following Claessens 
et al. (2002) and Gorton and Schmid (2000), this study measures bank size by the logarithm of 
total assets. With regards to GDP, following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Distinguin et al. 
(2013: 3303), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Naceur and Omran (2011: 6), this research 
measures economic growth by the percentage change in GDP at constant prices. Since real 
GDP is adjusted for inflation, controlling for real GDP is meaningful and relevant to liquidity 
risk, as it indicates the changes in physical production, which gives a clearer sign of the strength 
of the economy than nominal GDP. Moreover, real GDP provides brighter indicators for 
business cycles than nominal GDP. In addition, nominal GDP involves both quantity and 
changes in price, which may lead to disregarding the changes in physical production in the 
economy. Hence, real GDP offers a better gauge of the economic growth and performance 
inclusively.  
As regards to ‘ownership’, following Laeven and Levine (2009), Chalermchatvichien et al. 
(2014: 226), Shehzad et al., (2010), Cao and Petrasek (2014), Karyani and Utama (2015), this 
study measures the ownership concentration, which is defined as “the largest shareholder’s 
percentage ownership of the cash-flow rights attributable to a bank’s total equity” 
(Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014: 226). 
In considering the governance variables, on a macro level, we have included four ‘governance 
indicators’ for the sampled countries, among others, in line with Kaufmann et al. (2010):  
(i) ‘political stability and absence of violence/terrorism’, which assesses the “perceptions of 
the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism 
and it ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010: 4). The performance of banks in general and Islamic banks in particular 
is by definition affected by the political environment and the political stability a country has 
through ensuring business confidence. Therefore, the liquidity conditions of banks can be 
affected by the political stability of the country, as bank rushes can be result of political 
instability along with financial and economic crisis, which was evident, for example, in the 
1999 and 2000 financial crises in Turkey (Altunbas et al., 2009).  
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(ii) ‘government effectiveness’, which measures the “perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies and it ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance” (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 4). Since public policy making can 
affect the banking sector through various means, including the nature and operation of 
regulations, banks, including Islamic banks, are affected by government effectiveness and 
therefore it is included as a control variable in this study. 
(iii) ‘regulatory quality’ refers to the “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development and it ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance” (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 4). Regulatory quality is essential for the efficient 
operation and performance of the economy and the financial sector, which is also necessary in 
moderating the consequences of liquidity risk. Thus, an effective regulative environment 
aiming for the promotion of the banking sector will help to ease the liquidity risk exposure for 
the banking sector, including for Islamic banks. 
(v) ‘rule of law’, which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence and it ranges 
from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance” (Kaufmann et al., 
2010: 4). Since rule of law relates to enhancing confidence in the working nature of the entire 
political economy of a society, it is essential for the efficient working of banking and financial 
instruments and institutions. Hence, provision of an effective environment ensured by the ‘rule 
of law’ enhances confidence in customers and deposit account, which moderates and eases 
liquidity risk exposure beyond facilitating an effective political economy for the entire working 
of the banking system, including Islamic banks. 
4.4. Model Specification 
In order to investigate the association between the liquidity risk exposure as the dependent 
variable and the bank industry type, bank capital regulation and control variables, following 
the related banking literature (Saunders and Cornett, 2006; Ahmed, 2011; Barth et al., 2004; 
Beck et al., 2013; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Bhagat et al., 2011; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
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2008; Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011; Dinger and Hagen, 2009; Distinguin et al., 2013; Gatev and Strahan, 2006; 
Gill et al., 2011; Iannotta et al., 2007), this study develops the following panel data regressions 
model using random effects model with robust standard error: 
𝐿𝑅𝐸bit = ∝ +β1 CBbit +β2 HBbit +β3 CAPit +β4 LAbit +β5 CRbit +β6 LTDbit+ β7 PVit + β8 GEit + 
β9 RQit + β10 RLit + β11 OCbit +β12 SIZEbit + β13 GDPit + έ    
where: 
𝐿𝑅𝐸bit is the level of liquidity risk exposure that bank b in country i during the period t 
faces; 
α: the intercept;  
β1…βn : the regression coefficients;  
έ : the error term;  
CBbit denotes for conventional banks. It is a binary dummy variable with a value of ‘1’ if 
the bank is fully conventional and ‘0’ otherwise;  
HBbit signifies the hybrid banks (i.e. the conventional banks that offer Islamic financial 
services). The Islamic bank dummy is excluded and taken as the base for the other two 
dummies in the regression model.  
CAPit stands for the bank capital regulatory stringency that bank b operates under in the 
country i during the period t;  
LAbit denotes the ratio of liquid assets to total assets ratio of bank b in country i during 
the period t;  
CRbit refers to the credit risk of bank b in country i during the period t;  
LTDbit stands for the long-term debt-to-total-assets ratio of bank b in country i during the 
period t;  
PVit, as defined above, measures political instability in the country i during the period t 
that bank b operates in;  
GEit denotes government effectiveness in the country i during the period t that bank b 
operates in;  
RQit stands for regulative quality in the country i during the period t that bank b operates 
in;  
RLit denotes rule of law in the country i during the period t that bank b operates in;  
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OCbit refers to the ownership concentration of bank b in country i during the period t;  
SIZEbit refers to the size of the bank b in the country i during the period t;  
GDPit refers to the economic growth of the country i during the period t that bank b 
operates in.   
Table 2 displays the definitions of the dependent and independent variables of the empirical 
model.  
Table 2: Definitions of Variables  
Variable name Variable abbreviation Variable description 
Liquidity risk exposure LRE 
Liquidity risk exposure is measured by the financing gap that measures 
the possibility of banks being unable to meet their financial obligations in 
a timely manner. 
Conventional banks CB 
It is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if the bank is 
fully conventional and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Hybrid banks HB 
It is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if the bank is 
hybrid and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Bank capital regulation CAP 
The index measures the capital requirement and standards and consists of 
nine variables. The index equals the total score of variables scaled by the 
total number of variables. 
Credit risk CR Credit risk is measured by the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans. 
Long-term debt  LTD Long-term debt ratio is divided by total assets.                                                 
Liquid assets LA Ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism 
PV 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism measures perceptions 
of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated 
violence, including terrorism. 
Government effectiveness GE 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory quality RQ 
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
Rule of law RL 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
Ownership concentration OC Refers to the largest shareholder’s percentage ownership of the 
cash-flow rights attributable to a bank’s total equity 
Bank size SIZE Bank size is measured by the log of total assets. 
Economic growth GDP 
GDP is measured by the percentage change in real gross domestic product 
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5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Descriptive Data Analysis 
This section provides the descriptive statistics of the examined variables from the sampled 
banks, which helps to develop a better understanding of the liquidity position of the sampled 
banks and establishes a good platform for testing the developed hypotheses. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
stats LRE IB CB HB CAP CR LA LTD RQ PS GE RL OC SIZE GDP 
mean -0.40 0.26 0.41 0.33 0.69 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.44 0.28 0.44 0.48 37.26 3.71 4.9 
max 0.54 1 1 1 0.89 1.21 0.79 0.78 1.13 1.21 1.54 1.05 100 4.89 50.69 
min -30.28 0 0 0 0.33 -0.02 0 0 -0.2 -1.35 -0.39 -0.04 6.59 1.87 -4.1 
sd 2.5 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.36 0.62 0.47 0.23 25.95 0.63 4.76 
As shown in Table 3, the magnitude of LRE of the examined banks ranges between a minimum 
value of -30.28 and maximum value of 0.54 with a standard deviation of 2.5, which indicates 
the variation of the degrees of liquidity risk exposure between the examined banks during 
period in question. The overall liquidity risk of the examined banks recorded a mean value of 
-0.490, which implies that, overall, banks keep a good distance from being exposed to liquidity 
risk.  
As for CAP stringency, its value ranges between 0.33 and 0.89 with a mean value of 0.69. Such 
fluctuation suggests that the sampled countries do not stay on the same level of restriction in 
regulating capital requirements for the banking sector during the sample period. With regards 
to CR level, its magnitude ranges between -0.02 and 1.21 with a mean value of 0.03. The data 
indicate relatively low levels of external long-term debt or LTD funds that the examined banks 
hold indicated by the mean value of 0.04. On other the hand, LA, or the liquid assets of the 
examined banks, on average scores 0.13, representing 11.3 percent of total assets. As for the 
governance indicators, the results show that the regulatory quality scores 0.44 on average and 
ranges between -0.2 and 1.13, while the political stability scores 2.28 on average, and 
government effectiveness reached 0.44 on average. The results also show that the rule of law 
scores 0.48 and the ownership concentration of the examined banks are relatively well 
concentrated, with a mean value of 37.26. In relation to the size of total assets, the statistics 
show the average log of total assets of the examined banks ranging between 4.89 and 1.87, 
implying that the sampled banks had a different volume of total assets over the sample period. 
Finally, the real GDP growth rates of the assessed countries where the examined banks operate 
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score 4.9 on average and with a maximum and minimum of 50.69 and -4.1, respectively, 
suggesting different economic conditions that may positively or negatively affect their 
exposure to liquidity risk.  
Based on the results of this study, Islamic banks are more exposed to liquidity risk than 
conventional banks with a mean value of -.1064218   and -.1788504, respectively, as expected 
by hypothesis 1. However, inconsistent with hypothesis 2, the descriptive data analysis shows 
that hybrid banks are illustrated to be the safest in terms of facing liquidity risk, with a mean 
value of -1.18497. The obtained exposures to liquidity risk are consistent with the actual asset 
size of Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks, where the overall mean value of their total 
assets records US$ 8038.558, US$ 9320.807 and US$ 22030.9 million dollars, respectively. 
It can be argued that such differences in facing liquidity risk exposure are a direct result of the 
unique nature of Islamic banks’ financial operations and products, which are different from 
those of their conventional counterparts. This unique style leaves Islamic banks with more 
complications in managing their assets and liabilities positions. These results are consistent 
with the theoretically developed hypothesis 1. However, this is inconsistent with hypothesis 2, 
as the lowest exposure to liquidity risk is obtained in the case of hybrid banks; this could be a 
result of being a mixture of both Islamic and conventional banking and thus attracting higher 
levels of funds from clients of both systems. Based on the trend analysis in this section, it can 
be stated that the descriptive statistics indicate that Islamic banks are more exposed to liquidity 
risk in comparison to conventional and hybrid banks. It also evidences that hybrid banks were 
in a better liquidity position compared to conventional banks during the period in question.  
5.2. Empirical Findings 
After presenting the results of the descriptive analysis in the preceding section, this section 
presents the empirical results of the panel data regression with the random effects model to test 
the developed hypotheses. However, before presenting the results, this section initially presents 
some econometric tests that are conducted to confirm the reliability of the examined variables. 
To examine the normality of the data, skewness and kurtosis standards are applied. In order to 
have normally distributed data, following Dhaliwal et al. (2012: 732), this research uses the 
winsorising method. The winsorised data appear to be normally distributed, whereby the 
skewness results are between ± 1.96 and the coefficient of kurtosis ranges between ±3, as 
shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Normality Test 
Stats LRE IB CB HB CAP CR LA LTD RQ PS GE RL OC SIZE GDP 
Skewness -1.3 1.08 0.37 0.73 -0.22 1.06 1.99 5.00 -0.19 -0.53 0.09 -0.18 1.12 -0.28 1.65 
Kurtosis 1.55 2.16 1.14 1.53 1.75 2.91 1.78 2.94 1.96 2.38 2.27 2.73 2.70 2.44 2.25 
Due to the normally distributed data, this study applies the Pearson correlation matrix to 
investigate the multicollinearity between the examined variables. The results of the Pearson 
correlation matrix in Table 5 do not indicate a correlation value equivalent of or higher than 
0.8, which is considered as a threshold level by many authors in the literature (such as Brooks, 
2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Jing et al., 2008), which implies that the assessed variables 
are not highly correlated, as presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix Test 
  LRE CB HB CAP CR LA LTD RQ PS GE RL OC SIZE GDP 
LRE 1.00 
             
CB -0.10 1.00             
HB -0.19 -0.58 1.00            
CAP -0.12 0.46 -0.42 1.00           
CR -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.17 1.00          
LA 0.03 0.12 0.11 -0.08 -0.07 1.00         
LTD 0.07 -0.08 -0.13 0.07 -0.05 -0.16 1.00 
       
RQ -0.06 0.16 -0.27 0.44 0.05 -0.48 0.26 1.00 
      
PS -0.09 0.23 -0.12 0.38 0.08 -0.12 -0.16 0.30 1.00      
GE -0.06 0.20 -0.24 0.49 0.07 -0.43 0.20 0.73 0.54 1.00     
RL -0.06 0.22 -0.24 0.22 0.15 -0.22 0.04 0.60 0.61 0.61 1.00    
OC -0.15 -0.06 0.00 0.14 0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 1.00   
SIZE -0.10 -0.25 0.46 -0.20 -0.05 0.14 -0.08 0.41 -0.06 -0.23 -0.23 0.05 1.00  
GDP 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.23 0.18 -0.13 0.02 0.19 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.09 -0.13 1.00 
In analysing the data, the Hausman test is employed to examine the fitness of using panel data 
regressions with either the fixed effects model or the random effects model. As presented in 
Table 6, the Hausman test results demonstrate that the null hypothesis is accepted (0.182; p > 
0.1), implying the difference in coefficients is not systematic and hence suggests that the 
random effects is the most suitable method to estimate the determinants of liquidity risk.  
The use of random effect modelling is further rationalised due to the nature of some of the 
variables used in the modelling, namely the bank type variables, whether Islamic, conventional 
or hybrid, which are time-invariant. According to Nwakuya and Ijomah (2017: 277) a key 
“advantage of random effects is that you can include time invariant variables”. Given such 
nature, fixed effects model is not suitable as it does not estimate the effects of variables that do 
not change over time. Therefore, the fixed effects model is applied when the aim is only to 
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analyse the impact of variables that vary over time (Bell et al., 2019; Nwakuya and Ijomah, 
2017). In addition, another key characteristics of the fixed effects model, in the case of time-
invariant variables, is that it controls for them rather than measures their impact, which is the 
key purpose of this paper, where the aim is to measure the impact of the bank type (whether 
Islamic, conventional or hybrid) on liquidity risk. Furthermore, given that the results of the 
fixed effects model, as presented in Table 8, are consistent with the results generated by random 
effects model as depicted in Table 6, it can be suggested that the difference in coefficients is 
not systematic, suggesting that the random effect is the most suitable model in the case of the 
examined variables (Bell et al., 2019; Bell and Johns, 2015). 
As can be seen from the results, the overall model is significant (F-test = 0.000, p < 0.01), with 
R2 equal to 0.441, indicating that the goodness of fit statistics of the examined model are high, 
as presented in Table 6.  
Table 6: Estimating the Determinants of Liquidity Risk Exposure: Panel Data 
Regressions with Random Effects Model with Robust Standard Error 
LRE Coef.                                               z-value 
CB -0.365 -3.58*** 
HB -1.437 -5.37*** 
CAP -4.941 -6.05*** 
CR -0.238 -1.75* 
LA 0.128 0.360 
LTD 1.522 4.23*** 
RQ -0.974 -3.79*** 
PV -0.125 -1.99* 
GE 0.954 3.22** 
RL -1.016 -2.68** 
OC -0.011 -3.95*** 
SIZE -0.179 -2.5* 
GDP -0.005 -0.430 
_cons 4.996 6.6*** 
R-Square   0.441 
Prob > chi2   0.000 
Hausman  0.182 
Obs No   1454 
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
 
As the results in Table 6 depict, the panel data regressions model with the random effects model 
reports consistent results with hypotheses 1 and supports the theory of Islamic banking, 
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wherein conventional banks are less exposed to liquidity risk than Islamic banks by 0.336. 
Furthermore, the results show that hybrid banks are less exposed to liquidity risk than Islamic 
by 1.437. However, in contradiction with hypothesis 2, the empirical results detect that hybrid 
banks are even less exposed to liquidity risk than conventional banks, with a coefficient value 
of -1.437 compared to -0.336, suggesting a better liquidity position of the hybrid banks than 
Islamic and conventional banks. Such empirical results are supported by the descriptive data, 
where the overall liquidity risk mean scores of Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks are -
0.1064, -0.1788 and -1.1849, respectively. 
The empirical findings, thus, are theoretically acceptable, whereby the unique style of Islamic 
financial operations and products lead to different implications for the liquidity risk of Islamic 
banks compared to conventional and hybrid banks. This imposes greater degrees of 
complication on Islamic banks in managing their positions on both sides of the balance sheet. 
Due to the Islamic finance principles of prohibition of riba and gharar as well as profit-and-
loss and risk sharing (Khediri et al., 2015), Islamic banks need to operate under certain 
standards and restrictions on both sides of the balance sheet. In relation to such constraints, all 
financial contracts need to refer to a particular tangible underlying asset (Cox and Thomas, 
2005: 171). Such principles also imply that Islamic banks face more difficulties in selling debt-
based assets due to the constraints on sale of debt (Ahmed, 2011: 60). Thus, Islamic banks have 
less access to raising external funds in a Shari’ah-compatible manner from money markets 
(Ahmed, 2011: 60). Moreover, Islamic banks are restricted in their use of options and 
derivatives and other common conventional financial products due to the involvement of 
gharar features (El-Gamal, 2006: 61-62; Khan, 2010: 807), which reflects the wider range of 
difficulties in raising funds to cover their liquidity risk.  
The findings can also be explained by the relatively small size of the Islamic banking sector, 
the underdeveloped Islamic financial products, the absence of a multifaceted payment 
settlement scheme in accordance with Shari’ah, variances in standardisation of documentation, 
product, process and accounting standards, all of which impose different degrees of liquidity 
risk on Islamic banks (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008; Abdullah, 2011: 14). Moreover, due to the 
equity nature of the deposits, the uncertainty regarding depositors’ return expectation may 
increase the level of withdrawals (Beck et al., 2013: 436; El Gamal, 2006; Ben Arab and 
Elmelki, 2008: 80) and hence may cause higher degrees of liquidity risk to be faced by Islamic 
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banks compared to conventional and hybrid banks, as evidenced by the obtained results in 
Table 6.  
With regards to hybrid banks, their mixed nature enhances their liquidity position through the 
advantage of accumulating larger funds from customers of both systems. This is evidenced by 
the descriptive statistics, whereby the ‘size’ of hybrid banks scored the highest overall mean 
value of US$ 22,030.9 compared to Islamic and conventional banks, while size of Islamic 
banks scored a mean value of US$8,038.558 and the conventional banks’ size scored a mean 
value of US$9,320.807. In confirmation of this statement, the hybrid banks hold the largest 
amount of deposits with a mean value of US$18,108.82 million, while Islamic banks hold the 
lowest amount of deposits with a mean value of US$5,716.176 million. Thus, the sampled 
conventional banks hold lower levels of deposits than hybrid banks, yet higher than Islamic 
banks with a mean value of US$6,093.142 million. Such statistics support the statement that 
hybrid banks take advantage of their mixed nature of doing banking, which contradicts the 
expectation of hypothesis 2. 
As can be seen in Table 6, consistent with hypothesis 3, a negative relationship between 
stringency on bank capital regulatory requirement and the liquidity risk exposure of the banks 
is reported, which is statistically significant at 0.01 with a coefficient value of -4.94. This 
implies that an increase of 1 percent in the level of stringency on capital regulations of the 
sampled banks leads to a decrease in liquidity risk exposure by 4.94 percent, which suggests 
the important role that capital regulations play in the financial stability of the examined banks 
as a crucial element in influencing the bank activities, as highlighted by the Basel Committee 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009: 263; Distinguin et al., 2013: 3302). The results as depicted in Table 
6 are also consistent with the expectation that a greater value of bank capital regulation implies 
greater oversight standards under which the banks work, as stated by Barth et al. (2004), Klomp 
and Haan (2012: 3201), Distinguin et al. (2013: 3303) and Laeven and Levine (2009: 260). 
Such negative association can be explained by the argument that stricter capital regulation 
enhances banks’ capital ratio, as suggested by Distinguin et al. (2013: 3303) and enhances 
banks’ risk absorption capacity. Furthermore, the obtained results are supported by the 
‘financial fragility structure’ and ‘crowding-out of deposits theory’, thus expecting a negative 
association between capital regulatory stringency and banks’ lending activities (Distinguin et 
al., 2013: 3304) and, accordingly, narrowing down the bank financing gap. Since capital 
fragility decreases with a high ratio of equity capital, banks’ incentives to monitor borrowing 
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decreases, accordingly, as argued by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001), which may reduce the 
financing gaps of the banks. Moreover, the empirical results are consistent with Thakor’s 
(1996) position that high capital requirements stringency leads to a stricter screening process 
of generating new loans or expanding financing activities. Thus, applying such high standards 
on capital requirements minimises the financing gaps and hence lowers the level of liquidity 
risk exposure that banks face, as shown in Table 6.  
As the results in Table 6 depict, in verifying hypothesis 4, credit risk is negatively associated 
with the liquidity risk exposure of the examined banks and is statistically significant at 0.10 
with a coefficient value of -0.238. This indicates that an increase of 1 percent in the degree of 
the examined banks’ loan quality deterioration leads to a decrease in the liquidity risk exposure 
by 0.238 percent. The generated results can theoretically be supported by arguing that a high 
loan-loss provision to gross loans ratio implies an increase in the depreciation level in the credit 
quality, which leads to a deterioration in bank profitability and productivity (Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011: 311). In the case of a high deterioration of loan quality, a conscientious and 
effective bank management would focus on minimising the financing gap by reducing its 
lending activities by applying higher standards for generating new loans. Moreover, when a 
bank faces a high level of credit risk, it negatively impacts incentives for extending the existing 
loan and financing activities. Such behaviour may occur during the deterioration of loan or 
financing quality as a result of a negative impact of credit risk on banks’ ability to raise 
additional funds from the money market to meet their liquidity needs, as other money market 
participants are concerned about their high degrees of credit risk. It is commonly accepted that, 
in a rational money market, funds are costlier for a bank with high levels of credit risk. 
Considering such an environment, the rational position for banks with a high credit risk is to 
tighten their financing gap by reducing their lending and financing activities. In addition, the 
negative association between credit risk and liquidity risk exposure can be explained by 
arguing that an increase in bad loans may erode banks’ capital as they have to use their capital 
to cover their liquidity gaps, which, in turn, would negatively interrupt the banks’ ability to 
expand their lending and investment activities (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008: 525), which would 
narrow their financing gap and, hence, decrease their exposure to liquidity risk, as evidenced 
in Table 6.  
In regard to hypothesis 5, the expectation of a positive association between liquid assets and 
liquidity risk exposure is supported by the empirical results, as depicted in Table 6, where a 
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positive coefficient is detected; however, the results fail to detect any significant impact, which 
is in contradiction with the proposed hypothesis 5. Nevertheless, the detected positive 
association between long-term debt and liquidity risk exposure is in line with the hypothesis 
arguing that liquid assets are considered a ‘net defensive’ that protects banks against liquidity 
shocks (Davis, 2088: 114); hence, holding high levels of liquid assets induces banks to increase 
their risk-taking behaviour, as suggested by Wagner (2007: 122). The results support the 
argument that a bank with high liquid assets has confidence in obtaining easy access to the loan 
sales market, which makes the bank less exposed to bank runs and, hence, boosts its incentive 
to invest in risky assets or increase risk-taking activities, as stated by Cebenoyan and Strahan 
(2004: 19), which positively impacts the financing gap and, hence, exposes it to higher degrees 
of liquidity risk. 
In relation to the association between long-term debt and liquidity risk, the findings in Table 6 
are consistent with hypothesis 6, which suggests that long-term debts are positively correlated 
with liquidity risk and this is statistically significant at 0.01 with a coefficient value of 1.522, 
indicating that a 1 percent increase in the level of the long-term debts leads to an increase of 
liquidity risk by 1.522 percent. The detected positive association between long-term debt and 
liquidity risk exposure is in line with the hypothesis arguing that mangers may increase the 
debt ratio to increase their initial payoffs by expanding the business operations based on 
external debt financing (Bhagat et al., 2011: 1583). Moreover, high levels of long-term debt 
indicate the inability of banks’ management to internally raise the needed funds, which leaves 
banks with a negative reputation, as suggested by Bhagat et al. (2011: 1583). This in turn may 
lead to a customer panic, which in turn can lead to large amounts of withdrawals, which causes 
a wider financing gap and, hence, generates greater liquidity risk for banks. Furthermore, 
holding a high amount of debt may also discourage innovative business approaches that 
negatively impact bank productivity, as stated by Barnett and Salomon (2012: 1310) and 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007: 150), as high debt levels imply higher costs (Perrini et al., 
2008: 319; Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999: 229; Gill et al., 2011: 5). Hence, high levels of debt 
can lead to a decline in deposits and other funds, especially for Islamic banks, as deposits have 
some equity features. This, in turn, leaves banks with wider financing gaps, as is evidenced by 
the obtained results, as presented in Table 6. 
As for the control variables, the findings in Table 7 demonstrate a negative association between 
liquidity risk and regulatory quality, political stability, rule of law, ownership concentration 
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and bank size at the 0.01, 0.1, 0.05, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.1 statistical significance levels, 
respectively. The negative relationship for governance variables implies that better regulatory 
quality, political stability, and rule of law help to reduce the liquidity risk exposure, which 
should be considered as a positive impact in terms of providing an efficient and facilitating 
political economy environment. It should also be noted that, as the results report, government 
effectiveness has a positive relationship with liquidity risk exposure. indicating that 
government performance increases liquidity risk exposure rather than decreases it. This can be 
explained by the mistrust of public policy and government policy making in the sampled 
countries due to political pressure and the strong nature of the state as opposed to strong market 
forces, which can have a negative impact on the banking sector, including increasing the 
liquidity risk exposure.  
As regards to ownership concentration, it is significant at the one percent level with a rather 
small coefficient level of -0.011, which suggests that high ownership concentration helps to 
moderate the liquidity risk exposure. Therefore, the results suggest that the higher the 
ownership concentration the lower the liquidity risk exposure, suggesting a positive 
consequence. However, the political economy of ownership concentration is an important issue 
with further implications, which should be further explored in a critical manner.  
In addition, the results report a negative relationship between GDP and liquidity risk exposure, 
which implies that the expansion of the economy eases the liquidity constraints in the economy 
and contributes to the diminished liquidity risk exposure. However, the results indicate a very 
small impact, as indicated with the coefficient, and it seems to be statistically insignificant. 
5.3. Sensitivity Tests  
In order to examine the robustness of the results generated by this study based on panel data 
regressions with the random effects model and with the objective of controlling for potential 
interaction effects between the bank types (Islamic, conventional and hybrid banks) variables 
and the other independent variables on liquidity risk exposure, three further panel data 
regressions models with random effects are applied. 
Model I includes only bank type dummy variables, while model II includes bank type variables 
and control variables. In model III, all variables are included, however, with regards to the bank 
type variables, three dummy variables are included. The Islamic bank dummy variable is not 
Mohammad, Sabri; Asutay, Mehmet; Dixon, Rob & Platonova, Elena (2020). “Liquidity Risk Exposure 
and its Determinants in the Banking Sector: A Comparative Analysis between Islamic, Conventional and 
Hybrid Banks”.  
 
 32 
taken as the base and it is left to the Stata econometric software to omit one of the three 
dummies. The omitted variable, then, becomes the reference point against other dummies. This 
approach is conducted to leave the freedom of omitting one of the three dummy variables to 
the Stata software system to control for any bias impact of selecting a dummy variable as a 
base for the other two dummies (Brooks, 2008). The results of all three panel data regressions 
models are reported in Table 7; these have produced consistent outcomes with the main random 
effects regressions model presented in Table 6; however, different coefficient values are 
obtained due to controlling for the interaction effects of the examined variables.  
As can be seen in Table 7, model III reports that the Islamic banks dummy is omitted, 
suggesting the robustness of the main model as presented in Table 6. With regards to the 
direction of the coefficients of the dummy variables, models I, II and III report consistent 
results with the main model in the preceding section (see Table 6). The results suggest that 
conventional banks are less exposed to liquidity risk than Islamic banks, while hybrid banks 
are less exposed to liquidity risk than Islamic and conventional banks. This finding 
substantiates the argument that Islamic banks face higher levels of liquidity risk exposure than 
conventional and hybrid banks. Such results confirm that the unique nature of Islamic banking 
operations and financial products have different implications for the liquidity position. 
With regards to other determinants of liquidity risk exposure, model III, in consistence with 
the main model, as reported in Table 6, reports the same directions or signs of coefficients as 
well as the significant impact between liquidity risk exposure and the examined determinants. 
Models II and III report consistent results with the main model in Table 6 that indicate a 
negative and significant association between bank capital regulation stringency and liquidity 
risk exposure. In addition, model III detects negative and significant relationships between 
liquidity risk exposure and credit risk, a positive and insignificant association with liquid assets 
and a positive and significant association with long-term debts. In respect to the control 
variables, they are negatively associated with liquidity risk exposure through all the models. 
While bank size remains insignificant, as can be seen in the main model in Table 7, the GDP 
has a significant impact on liquidity risk. 
Furthermore, in order to check that the examined variables are exogenous, after running the 
regressions using the 2SLS instrumental variable test, the Durbin-Wu test is conducted to 
confirm the non-existence of an endogeneity threat. As can be seen in Table 7, the p-value of 
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Durbin-Wu is insignificant at 0.115, which suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; 
this, hence, confirms that all examined variables are exogenous. 
Table 7: The Determinants of Liquidity Risk Exposures (Model I, II and III): Panel Data 
Regressions with Random Effects Model Applying Robust Standard Error 
  Model I Model II Model III 
LR Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value 
CB- -0.079 3.58*** -0.032 -0.85* -0.365 -3.58*** 
HB- -1.083 5.54*** -1.152 4.26*** -1.437 -5.37*** 
CAP 
    
-4.941 -6.05*** 
CR 
    
-0.238 -1.75* 
LA 
    
0.128 0.36 
LTD 




-1.212 3.7*** -0.974 -3.79*** 
PS 
  
-0.476 -4.24*** -0.125 -1.99* 
GE 
  
0.541 1.99* 0.954 3.22** 
RL 
  
-0.314 -0.67 -1.016 -2.68** 
OC 
  
-0.013 4.05*** -0.011 -3.95*** 
SIZE 
  
-0.168 3.05** -0.179 -2.5* 
GDP 
  
-0.036 -2.51* -0.005 -0.43 
_cons -0.102 12.16*** 1.368 3.64*** 4.996 6.6*** 
R-Square 0.36   0.889   0.441 






    
0.182 
Durbin-Wu 
    
0.115 
Obs No 1996   1996   1454 
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
 
In order to examine the robustness of the obtained results of the random effects model as 
displayed in Table 6, this study conducts a further panel data regressions analysis using fixed 
effect model and the results are presented in Table 8. As it can be seen in Table 8, the fixed 
effect model results are consistent with the results of the random effect depicted in Table 6. It 
should be noted that while the results confirm the same direction of the association between 
the dependent and independent variables, the magnitude of the coefficients and the significance 
level of the examined variables are slightly different from the results of the random effect 
model, which is due to the different econometric characteristics of both models as suggested 
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Table 8: Estimating the Determinants of Liquidity Risk Exposures: Panel Data 
Regressions with Fixed Effects Model with Robust Standard Error 
LRE Coef. t-value 
CB -0.371 -3.46*** 
HB -1.182 -6.04*** 
CAR -4.298 -6.66*** 
CR -0.448 -2.94*** 
LA 1.878 3.06* 
LTD 0.680 3.11*** 
RQ -0.271 -0.97* 
PV -0.423 -3.03*** 
GE 0.229 0.73** 
RL -1.035 -2.86*** 
OC -0.012 -4.54*** 
SIZE -0.910 -4.5*** 
GDP -0.029 -2.21*** 










Obs No   1454 
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
Table 9: Cointegration Tests 
Kao test for cointegration Statistic p-value 
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -7.4955 0.0000 
Dickey-Fuller t -9.5632 0.0000 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -5.4680 0.0000 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller t -13.0947 0.0000 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t -10.6150 0.0000 
Pedroni test for cointegration Statistic p-value 
Modified Phillips-Perron t 2.3588 0.0092 
Phillips-Perron t -8.8826 0.0000 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -5.9935 0.0000 
Westerlund test for cointegration Statistic p-value 
Variance ratio 13.1458 0.0020 
*All panels are cointegrated when p-value < 0.01 
 
In an attempt to check the robustness of the estimation of the random effects model depicted 
in Table 6, this study conducts a further examination using panel cointegration tests, namely 
Kao, Pedroni and Westerlund test for which the results can be found in Table 9. The key 
characteristic of these tests is that, while, they all share a common null hypothesis of no 
cointegration, the alternative hypothesis suggests that the variables are cointegrated implying 
that they have a long-run association (Neal, 2014; Stata: 2019). Based on the results of all 
cointegration test in Table 9, where p-value < 0.01, it can be stated that all the tests reject the 
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null hypothesis of no cointegration, and therefore, the results confirm the hypothesis of the 
existence of cointegrated relation among the examined variables verifying a stable and long-
run association. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Based on the assessed data of the sampled banks over the period of 1996–2015, this paper 
provides statistical evidence for the liquidity risk exposure of Islamic banks in a comparative 
manner with conventional and hybrid banks. The results demonstrate that Islamic banks are 
more exposed to liquidity risk than conventional and hybrid banks. In addition, the results 
empirically report that hybrid banks are less vulnerable to liquidity risk than Islamic and 
conventional banks. These empirical results are consistent with the theory of Islamic banking 
principles, whereby the unique nature of their financing and operation imposes higher degrees 
of complexity in managing their asset and liability positions and, hence, causes a greater 
financing gap that increases their liquidity risk exposure.  
With regards to the key determinants of liquidity risk exposure, this paper suggests that stricter 
capital regulations incentivise banks to apply sterner standards and a stricter screening process 
for new borrowers, which lessens their lending and financing activities, tightening the 
financing gap and accordingly lowering the level of liquidity risk exposure that the examined 
banks face. The empirical results, moreover, suggest that credit risk is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the liquidity risk exposures of banks. Consistent with the proposed 
hypothesis, the empirical results detect that the liquid assets ratio is positively associated with 
the liquidity risk exposures of the examined banks, yet without any significant impact. In 
addition, the results show that the long-term debt ratio positively affects the liquidity risk 
exposure and is statistically significant. The positive impact of the governance variables should 
also be considered as important factors in providing a facilitating political economy 
environment for the efficient operations of Islamic banks by moderating and decreasing the 
liquidity risk exposure. This also applies to the ownership concentration variable, as a higher 
ownership concentration seems to reduce the liquidity risk exposure, for which, however, 
further critical examination is suggested.  
Based on the theoretical argument and the obtained results, this research alerts the commercial 
banks in general and commercial Islamic banks in particular to the importance of enhancing 
innovation in product development to overcome the consequences of early liquidation. Hence, 
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this research suggests that more efforts need to be taken in research and development in product 
development related to liquidity easing and the money market within Shari’ah-compliancy. 
Accordingly, this implies that Islamic banks in particular and conventional banks in general 
need to allocate more funds for further research in the field of product development and 
financial engineering.  
One of the key sources of liquidity risk in the Islamic banking sector are the different 
interpretations of Islamic law by scholars, such as in the case of bay al-dayn (sale of debt), 
which leads to a lack of globally accepted instruments for managing liquidity risk. In 
responding to this problem, this research highlights the importance of establishing national and 
international Shari’ah supervisory boards that would gather the majority of the worldwide-
recognised Shari’ah scholars to standardise the approval of dynamic instruments which can be 
accepted globally for managing liquidity risk. The efforts by the AAOIFI for developing 
standards for national Shari’ah boards represent a welcoming initiative. 
As mentioned previously, the unique nature of the Islamic financial products and operations 
have different implications for liquidity risk exposures. The empirical results of this study 
highlight the need for promoting the liquidity infrastructure of the banks in general and of 
Islamic banks in particular, such as International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation 
in Malaysia, which plays a dynamic role in offering short-term sukuk to manage surpluses and 
the demands of liquidity for the entire Islamic banking industry.  
This research also highlights the importance of the deposit insurance based on takaful, which 
may increase customers’ trust in the Islamic banking industry. This, in turn, may lead to the 
accumulation of more funds, which will positively affect banks᾿ liquidity positions.  
Moreover, using authentic, namely non-organised or simple, tawarruq in the case of necessity 
may also be an option for managing liquidity needs. However, it is crucial to emphasise that it 
must be free of prearranged transactions to avoid any controversial aspects relating to organised 
nature of the practised tawarruq, which is not considered Shari’ah compliant. Practicing such 
an authentic instrument can be enhanced by promoting the role of independent agencies in 
facilitating the tawarruq transactions for all parties, that is, the bank, the commodity vendor 
and the commodity buyer. However, it is important to mention that using tawarruq may 
discourage innovation in the field of product development in the Islamic financial markets.  
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Furthermore, this research emphasises the significance of establishing internationally accepted 
financial criteria related to products, operations and accounting standards that would positively 
affect the promotion of the liquidity position of Islamic banks, which should be positively 
considered. Having said that, it is also important to stress that away from the mimicking 
process, Islamic banks and financial institutions should consider investing more in research 
and development and innovation to develop authentic products and solutions to overcome the 
liquidity management challenges along with other problems they face. 
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